Removing Access to Health Care from Employer and State Control: The ACA as Anti-Subordination Legislation by Koeninger, W. David
University of Baltimore Law Review
Volume 44
Issue 2 Spring 2015 Article 3
2015
Removing Access to Health Care from Employer
and State Control: The ACA as Anti-Subordination
Legislation
W. David Koeninger
Advocates for Basic Legal Equality, Inc. (ABLE)
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Review by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Koeninger, W. David (2015) "Removing Access to Health Care from Employer and State Control: The ACA as Anti-Subordination
Legislation," University of Baltimore Law Review: Vol. 44: Iss. 2, Article 3.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr/vol44/iss2/3
REMOVING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE FROM 
EMPLOYER AND STATE CONTROL: THE ACA AS ANTI-
SUBORDINATION LEGISLATION 
W. David Koeninger * 
In trying to explain why the United States, unlike every other 
western industrial democracy, lacks a national health care system, 
refonners usually tell a story about labor unions and large 
corporations each taking advantage of favorable post-World War II 
conditions to forge an alliance in their mutual interest, creating our 
system of employer-based health insurance. I Thus, the story goes, 
our failure to agree upon the need for a national health plan results 
from "the American health policy trap,"-what Paul Starr has 
described as "a system of employer-provided insurance that conceals 
its true costs from those who benefit from it."2 However, an 
examination of the claims of those aligned against the 
implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(ACA)3 suggests that this is not the full story. 
The federal government's first meaningful involvement in health 
care came during Reconstruction, as the Freedman's Bureau sought 
to address the health needs of fonner slaves.4 Then, as now, there 
was deep concern over how much government involvement was 
necessary and the "danger" of instilling dependence on the 
government in otherwise able-bodied individuals. 5 Thus, the 
American health care system has exhibited what Nicole Huberfeld 
* Deputy Director, Vennont Legal Aid, Inc., Burlington, Vermont. The author also 
wishes to thank the Center for Applied Feminism and the participants in the Applied 
Feminism and Health Conference for their support and feedback on this piece. 
Special thanks go to Rebecca Zietlow for her helpful comments and constant 
encouragement, and to Alice and Zoe Koeninger for being their inspirational selves. 
Finally, thanks to the editors of the Law Review, especially Marie Long. 
1. See P AUL STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION: THE PECULIAR AMERICAN STRUGGLE OVER 
HEALTH CARE REFORM 42 (2011) [hereinafter STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION]. 
2. See id. at 122-23. 
3. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010) (codified in scattered sections of26 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). 
4. See JIM DOWNS, SICK FROM FREEDOM: AFRICAN-AMERICAN ILLNESS AND SUFFERING 
DURING THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 45-46 (2012). 
5. ld. at 72. 
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has called "path dependence"-with access to health care linked to 
labor for the able-bodied and linked to frailty for those who would 
rely on government programs.6 Further, access to health care became 
a means of control-for employers to control their workers and state 
governments to control their citizens.7 To those who oppose the 
ACA, that statute is dangerous precisely because it threatens this state 
of affairs, allowing workers to obtain health care independently from 
employment and attempting to nationalize the Medicaid program 
over state objections. 
At its passage, the Affordable Care Act was seen by many as a civil 
rights enactment, with South Carolina Congressman James Clyboum 
describing it as the "civil rights act of the twenty-first century."8 And 
yet, of all the briefs filed before the Supreme Court in NFIB v. 
Sebelius,9 only the amicus brief of the National Women's Law Center 
actually argued that the ACA should be upheld as civil rights 
legislation within the ambit of the Commerce Clause (remedying 
discrimination against women).IO Many of the lawsuits filed to 
challenge the ACA have implicated women's access to birth control 
and family planning. II Almost all of the challenges implicate access 
to health care as a means of control, a means of reducing worker 
autonomy and usurping women's sexual autonomy. 
6. See Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431, 439 n.31 
(2011) [hereinafter Huberfeld, Federalizing MedicaidJ; Nicole Huberfeld et aI., 
Plunging into Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REv. 1, 10 (2013) [hereinafter Huberfeld 
et aI., Plunging into Endless Difficulties] (describing the American healthcare system 
as path-dependent). 
7. See STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION, supra note 1, at 47; PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 312 (1982) [hereinafter STARR, SOCIAL 
TRANSFORMATION)' 
8. JOHN E. McDONOUGH, INSIDE NATIONAL HEALTH REFORM 305 (2011); see also Hagop 
Kantarjian, Parallels Between the Affordable Care Act and the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, BAKER INST. BLOG (June 9, 2014), 
http://blog.chron.comlbakerblogl2014/06/parallels-between-the-affordable-care-act-
and-the-civil-rights-act-of-1964/ (comparing divisions in Congress and differences of 
opinion over the Civil Rights Act of 1964 from 50 years ago with the current divisive 
debate over the Affordable Care Act). One of my contentions in this article is that, as 
with the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the dislike of the ACA is significantly motivated by 
racial considerations. 
9. Nat'l Fed'n ofIndep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
10. See W. David Koeninger, The Statute Whose Name We Dare Not Speak: EMTALA 
and the Affordable Care Act, 16 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 139, 177 & n.276 (2013). 
11. See, e.g., Grote Industries, LLC v. SebeJius, 914 F. Supp. 2d 943, 945-48 (S.D. Ind. 
2012); Monaghan v. Sebelius, 931 F. Supp. 2d 794,797-99 (E.D. Mich. 2013). 
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In order for the ACA to be an effective reform of our health care 
system and to achieve its anti-subordination goals, supporters must 
focus the debate over the ACA's various requirements on those who 
will benefit from its policy reforms, which are designed to reduce 
health disparities and remedy the effects of race and gender 
discrimination. Thus, in these cases, feminists can help the cause of 
health care justice by invoking anti-subordination theory in support 
of the challenged provisions of the ACA.12 
In Part I, I will describe the historical use of access to health care as 
a means of controlling workers and low-income, often minority, 
citizens. Part II will discuss how key provisions of the ACA, its 
health care exchanges, mandatory benefits, federal subsidies, and 
Medicaid expansion, operate to liberate individuals from employer 
and state government control. Part III will review some of the types 
of lawsuits filed to challenge the implementation of the ACA, 
particularly the Hobby Lobby!3 decision and others implicating 
women's access to healthcare. Finally, Part IV will suggest an anti-
subordination view of health care reform that can serve as a means of 
responding to ACA lawsuits and supporting the implementation of 
the ACA. 
I. PATH-DEPENDENT HEALTH CARE: ORIGINS AND 
CONSEQUENCES 
Nicole Huberfeld has used the term "path-dependent" to describe 
the Medicaid program.14 Put simply, "path dependence" denotes the 
idea that history may dictate a set of rules relating to a specific 
choice, making that choice much less deliberate, and therefore less 
voluntary, than it might have been without the initial set of 
decisions. 15 In government health care programs, and in our public-
private health care system generally, path dependence has proven to 
be critical; past decisions influence future decisions. 16 Given the 
significance of past decisions, this Part will examine briefly some of 
the history of the American government's involvement in health care 
and the development of our employer-based health care system. 
12. Anti-subordination theory focuses on ending the race or gender-based practices that 
perpetuate historical discrimination. See infra notes 190-98 and accompanying text. 
13. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2762 (2014). 
14. Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, supra note 6, at 439 & n.3l. 
15. Id. 
16. See id. at 438-39 & n.31; see also Huberfeld et aI., Plunging into Endless Difficulties, 
supra note 6, at 10. 
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Such a review is necessary in order to highlight the manner in 
which our health care system has evolved, with its emphasis on work 
vs. dependence, the worthy vs. the unworthy, the deserving vs. the 
undeserving, and its incorporation of discriminatory societal norms 
dating back to Reconstruction. In both governmental programs and 
employer-sponsored plans, these themes repeat and recur over time. 
Therefore, advocates must understand this history in order to respond 
to challenges to the ACA, which is intended to undo these emphases 
and dissolve the discriminatory norms that have been woven into our 
health care system. 
A. Reconstruction - Establishing Health Care Themes 
In 1863, President Abraham Lincoln issued the Emancipation 
Proclamation, freeing the slaves but putting the health of many 
freedpeople at risk. l ? Four million formerly enslaved persons were 
now free to seek work but, if they could not find it, they would be 
subject to hunger, lack of housing, and ultimately sickness and 
disease. 18 It was not until 1865 that the federal government 
established the Freedman's Bureau to address some of the 
consequences of emancipation.19 This included the first-ever federal 
health care program.20 
The process is described in Jim Downs' book, Sick From Freedom: 
African American Illness and Suffering During the Civil War and 
Reconstruction.21 As Downs explains, the federal government's 
intervention in health matters in the South included two critical 
emphases. First, "[t]he federal government's obsession with 
freedpeople's labor ... circumscribed how freedpeople's health 
would be defined and who would define it."22 That is, the federal 
government's primary interest in the health of freed slaves was linked 
to its desire to take advantage of their labor power,23 and those who 
were not able-bodied were forcibly separated from those who could 
work. 24 Thus, the notion that an employer or governmental authority 
could define health for the purpose of taking advantage of an 
individual's labor power has been woven into our health care system 
for 150 years. Second, because of the federal government's 
17. See DOWNS, supra note 4, at 42-52. 
18. Id. at 8, 166-70. 
19. Id.at45. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 45-46. 
22. Id. at 64. 
23. See id. at 45. 
24. /d. at 121. 
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obsession with freedpeople's labor, every aspect of its medical 
program in the South gave rise to anxiety that providing government 
health care to able~bodied individuals would render them dependent 
on the federal government.25 This anxiety was so pervasive that in 
the end, the constant pressure, to reduce relief and medical aid 
"undermined the operations or' the first-ever federal health care 
program. "26 
These three themes-the definition of health as the ability to 
provide labor, evaluated by a third party employer or government 
entity; the emphasis on tailoring benefit programs to aid those who 
are not able-bodied or (as with children) are not able to work; and the 
corrosive anxiety about creating government dependence by 
providing assistance to the able-bodied-recur throughout the history 
of health care delivery in the United States.27 Moreover, they entwine 
with race and gender in ways that we are still attempting to unwind. 
For example, in her work, Professor Huberfeld discusses the idea of 
the "deserving" and undeserving poor and locates it in the 
Elizabethan poor laws.28 However, the three themes described by 
Downs suggest that, after the Civil War, notions of the worthy and 
unworthy poor became inextricably linked with race. 29 
From the 1880s onward, the federal government would have little 
direct involvement in the health of its citizens. 30 In the meantime, the 
25. Id. at 72. 
26. Id. at 73-74. Indeed, the congressional debates over the Freedman's Bureau produced 
a curious tension that ultimately characterized the Bureau's work: a desire to help 
emancipated slaves mitigated by the longstanding congressional hesitancy to exercise 
full powers in health matters and by the concern that providing anything more than 
temporary assistance would engender dependence on the government among the 
emancipated. See id. 
27. See generally Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, supra !lote 6 (discussing the two 
themes of "the deserving poor" and "states' rights"). As the American health system 
developed, private businesses made the conscious choice to provide health care to 
their workers in order to avoid the perceived larger evil of expanding the federal 
government's involvement in health care. See infra Part II. 
28. Huberfeld et aI., Plunging into Endless Difficulties, supra note 6, at 13. 
29. See Karen Ross, Civil War, Emancipation, and the Struggle for Health and Freedom, 
H-SOUTH (July 2013), http://www.h-net.orglreviews/showrev.php?id=36498; Jennifer 
Schuessler, Liberation as Death Sentence, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2012), 
ht1p:llwww.nytimes.coml2012106llI/books/sick-from-freedom~by-jim-downs-about-freed­
slaves.htm1?pagewanted=all&_r=O; see also supra notes ICr-27 and accompanying text. 
30. There was little change in the "abominable" health status of blacks from the end of 
Reconstruction until the beginning of the Great Depression. See ALONDRA NELSON, 
BODY AND SOUL: THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY AND THE FIGHT AGAINST MEDICAL 
DISCRIMINATION 26 (2011). 
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expanded use of the concept of the worthy poor was reinforced by a 
substantial body of racist literature and research. 31 Blacks, for their 
part, engaged actively in developing their own medical institutions 
and research in order to counter the spread of scientific racism. 32 
Simultaneously, though, social reformers were embracing eugenics as 
a means of alleviating poverty, forging links between the concept of 
racial inferiority and the term "the undeserving poor."33 While these 
reformers may have been well-intentioned researchers attempting to 
understand the causes of poverty, they ultimately contributed to the 
use of the term "the undeserving poor" as an excuse for 
discrimination on the basis of race and gender. 
B. Post-World War II: Foundations a/the Current System 
The practice of providing access to health care through 
employment fits neatly with Reconstruction-era concerns about 
ensuring a healthy workforce and avoiding the creation of 
dependence on the government. Prior to the late 1940s, employee 
health care had not been a subject of collective bargaining, with both 
employers and unions attempting to use medical care as a means of 
cementing greater worker loyalty. 34 Employers, of course, also 
wanted to be able to say when injured workers were fit enough to 
return to work; and so they developed the institution of the company 
doctor.35 
It was not until the Supreme Court's ruling in the Inland Steel case 
in 1949 that it became clear that employee benefits plans were part of 
the terms and conditions of employment that could be subjects of 
31. See id. at 42-48. For example, in 1896, Frederick L. Hoffman published Race Traits 
and Tendencies in the American Negro, an influential tract of scientific racism, 
claiming that the higher mortality rates of blacks could be attributed to "racially weak 
biological inheritance and the ill-effects of emancipation." Id. at 44. 
32. ALONDRA NELSON, supra note 30, at 24-32, 36-38, 43-46. The fact that such racist 
attitudes have persisted and continued to influence health care policy is not a measure 
of ineffectiveness on the part of Black scientists and educators, but rather an example 
of the tenacity of racism itself and the power of narrative to justify path-dependent 
decisions. 
33. See MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR: AMERICAN'S ENDURING 
CONFRONTATION WITH POVERTY 29-39 (2d ed. 2013). 
34. See STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 7, at 312 (describing "[the] 
management tradition of company-run medical services, strong in the mining, lumber, 
and textile industries, and a union tradition of labor-run clinics and insurance 
programs, strong only in the garment industry."). 
35. See id. at 312,317; see also John George, The Return of the Company Doctor, PHiLA. 
Bus. J. (May 1, 2014, 8:55 AM), http://www.b~oumals.comlphi1adelphia/bloglhea1th­
carel2014/05/the-retum-of-the-company-doctor.htrnl?page=all. 
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collective bargaining.36 Unions, which initially had hoped for a 
program of government-sponsored national health insurance, 
accepted this state of affairs because it enabled them to claim 
collective bargaining victories while providing their members with a 
significant benefit. 37 Unfortunately, this system did not, and never 
really has, served the interests of retirees, the unemployed, the self-
employed, or those who work at low-paying jobs that do not provide 
fringe benefits.38 Moreover, the employment-based system that 
developed left the ability of employers to define health for their 
employees largely intact. 39 Employers benefited most by avoiding 
mandated national health insurance and retaining control over the 
choice of an insurance carrier and other plan details.40 
By 1958, the paradigm for the next several decades had been set: a 
family's likelihood of having health insurance depended on its total 
income and the employment situation of the chiefbreadwinner.41 If a 
family's income was in the top third of the population and the main 
earner was fully employed, there was a 78 percent chance of the 
family having health insurance.42 "Where the main earner was 
employed in manufacturing, the chance of having insurance was 91 
percent."43 Additionally, "[t]wo-thirds of those who lived in the 
Northeast, the Midwest, or the West had some insurance," compared 
to "only about half of those who lived in the South."44 Even private 
sector health care access tracked patterns from the Reconstruction 
era.45 
C. Medicare and Medicaid 
Though they are often confused, Medicare and Medicaid may be 
distinguished fairly easily-Medicare is for older people (over age 
65), and Medicaid is for poor people (depending on the particular 
36. See STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 7, at 313. 
37. See id. at 330,333. 
38. Jd. at 333. 
39. See id. at 314. 
40. Jd. 
41. Jd. at 334. 
42. Jd. 
43. Jd. 
44. Jd. 
45. Compare DOWNS, supra note 4, at 64, 72 with STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, 
supra note 7, at 334 (demonstrating that unions had failed to improve access to health 
care in the same part of the country where the Freedman's Bureau had failed to 
improve access to health care nearly a century earlier). 
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state's definition of poverty).46 Congress, when it enacted both 
programs, actually thought of them as the sum of three parts.47 
Medicare Part A covered hospital care for the elderly.48 Medicare 
Part B covered out-patient care for the elderly.49 Medicaid was the 
third and least popular part, providing medical insurance for those 
dependent on government financial assistance, such as women and 
children deemed eligible for the Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) cash-assistance welfare program, and single, adult 
males eligible for either Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled 
or Aid to the Aged, Blind, or Disabled.50 In a striking illustration of 
path dependence, the two War on Poverty-era programs track the 
lines drawn by the Freedmen's Bureau for the administration of its 
aid during Reconstruction. The aid to be provided by the government 
through Medicaid and Medicare would assist only those who, by 
necessity or by definition, were dependent on the government and not 
those otherwise considered to be able-bodied.51 
Notwithstanding this similarity, the programs were, and continue to 
be, supported by different payment schemes, creating significant 
differences between them. 52 Those differences also track distinctions 
originating from the Reconstruction era. 53 The Medicaid Act created 
a program of cooperative federalism paid for by both state and 
federal governments. 54 In contrast, Medicare is a freestanding, 
entirely federal, program available to all who have qualified for 
46. See STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION, supra note 1, at 46-47 (pointing out that because 
welfare eligibility standards differed among the states, it might be easier to qualifY for 
Medicaid in a wealthier state like New York than in a comparatively poorer state like 
Mississippi); see also Medicare Versus Medicaid, MEDICARE MADE CLEAR 
http://www.medicaremadeclear.comlaboutlmedicare-vs-medicaidl (last updated July 
30,2014,3:15 PM). 
47. STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 7, at 369. 
48. See id. 
49. See id. 
50. See 42 U.S.c. §§ 1351, 1382(a)(I), 1396a(a)(lO)(A)(i) (2012); STARR, SOCIAL 
TRANSFORMATION, supra note 7, at 369; What is AFDC?, CENSUS.GOV (Oct. 21, 
2011), http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/statbriefs/whatAFDC.htm\. 
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(i)-(xiii); STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 7, at 
370. 
52. See Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, supra note 6, at 446-47; How is Medicare 
Funded?, MEDlCARE.Gov, http://www.medicare.gov/about-uslhow-medicare-is-
fundedlmedicare- funding.html (last visited Jan. II, 2015). 
53. See DOWNS, supra note 4, at 46; STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 7, at 
370. 
54. See Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, supra note 6, at 447. 
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social security benefits by paying into the social security system. 55 It 
has never been associated with welfare programs. 56 Medicare also 
always has had uniform national standards for eligibility and 
benefits. 57 
D. Biological Citizenship: Critiquing Medicaid and Medicare 
While Medicaid and Medicare undoubtedly expanded access to 
health care for millions, those programs did not end medical 
discrimination, and their subtle reinforcement of the divide between 
the worthy and unworthy poor was seen by some as validating racial 
health disparities. Accordingly, they inspired criticism from some 
activists on the political left. 58 For example, to the Black Panther 
Party, programs such as Medicaid and Medicare were insufficient 
because "marginalized communities were left with an anemic if 
sometimes efficacious form of biological inclusion in the place of 
racial equality, social justice, and economic citizenship."59 In other 
words, the Black Panthers were critical of the Medicare and Medicaid 
programs because they incorporated the limits on governmental 
involvement in health care that arose during Reconstruction. 
In order to have access to health care, applicants were required to 
demonstrate their "damaged biology," thereby maintaining the racist 
myth that blacks were biologically inferior. 60 According to the 
myths, of course, blacks were inferior because they did not want, 
could not get, or would not keep jobs, so they could not get health 
care through employment or would not earn enough to qualify for 
Medicare.61 However, if they were willing to present themselves as 
damaged and dependent on the government, as welfare moms and 
children, or as sick and disabled adults, they could get health care 
from the government (i.e., Medicaid).62 What they wanted was equal 
55. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-15(c) (2012); STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 7, 
at 369-70. 
56. See STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 7, at 370; Basic Introduction to 
Medicare, MEDICAREADVOCACY.ORG, http;llwww.medicareadvocacy.orgimedicare-
info/medicare-basics-21 (last visited Jan. 11,2015). 
57. See STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 7, at 370. 
58. NELSON, supra note 30, at 14. 
59. Id. at 184. 
60. Id. at 184-85. 
61. See KATZ, supra note 33, at 29-39 (describing hereditarian and environmental 
"explanations" for poverty and the lack of economic success among blacks). 
62. NELSON, supra note 30, at 184-86. 
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citizenship; what they got was stigma.63 As will be shown in Part II, 
the Panthers critique has proven to be right, as opponents of the ACA 
have sought to oppose the expansion of Medicaid by characterizing it 
simultaneously as a program for those who are dependent and a 
program that creates dependence among its recipients. 
II. THE ACA: CHALLENGING PATH DEPENDENCE 
Other than some expansions to Medicaid and Medicare and the rise 
of HMOs in the private sector, there was little change from 1986 to 
2008, in the manner in which Americans could access health care.64 
In the 1990s, Hilary Clinton was tasked with developing and passing 
reform but was soundly defeated by the insurance industry. 65 Thus, 
immediately prior to the enactment of the ACA, the components of 
the American health care system could be summarized as follows: a 
federal government program operated under federal standards for 
retired and disabled workers (Medicare );66 a joint federal-state 
program for disabled individuals with no work history and poor 
children (and sometimes their parents), with eligibility, payment, and 
coverage standards ultimately set by states with an eye toward 
limiting individual dependence on government programs 
(Medicaid);67 and a system of private insurance primarily provided 
through employers that selected the carrier and coverage that would 
63. Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare and the Problem of Black Citizenship, 105 YALE LJ. 
1563, 1576-77 (1996) (book review describing the distinction between "citizens" who 
are entitled to government assistance and "subjects" who receive assistance only at the 
government's discretion). 
64. See Timeline: History of Health Reform in the u.s., KAISER FAM. FOUND., 
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files. wordpress.coml20 11 /03/5 -02-13 -history-of-health-
reform.pdf (last visited Jan. 11,2015). 
65. See STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION, supra note 1, at 113-19; JOHN DITTMER, THE 
GOOD DOCTORS 247 (2009). 
66. See McDONOUGH, supra note 8, at 23-24, 156 (noting that prior to the enactment of 
the Affordable Care Act, approximately 46 million Americans were covered by 
Medicare, of which approximately 8 million were disabled and under the age of sixty-
five); see also supra Part I.e. 
67. See id; see also STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION, supra note 1, at 46-47 (explaining 
that states have the discretion to limit the perceived danger that receipt of Medicaid 
will lead to increased dependence on the government by narrowing eligibility criteria, 
and reducing the scope of the services offered, as well as the payments offered to 
health-care providers, and that such restrictions are consistent with the perception that 
Medicaid recipients have an inferior moral claim to their benefits); see also supra Part 
I.e. 
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be provided to their employees.68 This system remained rife with 
disparities based on race and income. 
The ACA proposed69 to do several things that would challenge the 
path dependence of our health care system; expanding Medicaid and 
changing its eligibility methodology to a purely financial one; 
requiring large employers to provide health insurance to their 
employees or face a fine; and creating subsidized health care 
exchanges that would enable individuals to purchase affordable 
health insurance independently of the terms and conditions of their 
employment. 70 It also proposed to invade the employer's prerogative 
to determine which benefits it would provide to its employees by 
mandating that large employers include specific items of preventive 
care in their benefits packages. 71 
A. The Medicaid Expansion 
As originally written, the ACA expansion would have created near-
uniform eligibility across the nation based on a single method of 
counting income without categorical distinctions.72 Whether working 
or not, nearly all individuals with family incomes below 133% of the 
federal poverty level would be eligible for benefits on an equal 
basis.73 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court made that optionaU4 
In doing so, the Court held that the Medicaid expansion was not an 
addition to the old Medicaid program, like the other program 
expansions enumerated above, but an entirely new program. 75 This, 
of course, is only true if one thinks of Medicaid as a program solely 
68. See McDONOUGH, supra note 8, at 23-24 (explaining that while other developed 
nations relied on public health care, the United States utilized a system of private 
health insurance provided primarily through employers, and only later created 
Medicare and Medicaid to assist those unable to secure private insurance); see also 
supra Part LB. 
69. Given that the employer mandate still has not been fully implemented, it seems 
appropriate to refer to the ACA's terms as proposals. See Mark A. Hall, Evaluating 
the Affordable Care Act: The Eye of the Beholder, 51 Hous. L. REv. 1029, 1051 
(2014) (noting that the employer mandate provision of the Affordable Care Act will 
not take effect until 2015). 
70. See McDONOUGH, supra note 8, at 124, 127 (discussing how subsidies will be used to 
make the purchase of health insurance more affordable, and how exchanges will 
provide a marketplace through which individuals can purchase health insurance); see 
also infra Part I1.B. 
71. See infra Part II.C. 
72. McDoNOUGH, supra note 8, at 152. 
73. See id. 
74. See Nat'l Fed'n ofIndep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012). 
75. Id. at 2605-06. 
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for the dependent or biologically dependent rather than as a need-
based health care program. Essentially, Justice Roberts's thinking 
reverts to the Freedman's Bureau model, holding that a program to 
help the indigent and disabled is one thing, but a program in which 
able-bodied persons with low-incomes can access health care is a 
"shift in kind, not merely degree."76 Put more bluntly, it was a shift 
to a program that would cover both the deserving and the 
undeserving poor. 
The consequences of an optional Medicaid expansion program are 
now clear. Despite incredibly attractive federal reimbursement 
rates-lOO% initially and then gradually declining to 90%-23 states 
have not yet chosen to accept federal funding to expand Medicaid. 77 
A study conducted by the Urban Institute, Ohio State University, and 
the Health Policy Institute of Ohio (HPIO) gives some idea of the 
money at stake in the states and therefore the overwhelming power of 
the traditional distinction between the worthy and the unworthy 
poor.78 The HPIO found that the state of Ohio could save $1.6 billion 
over 10 years by expanding Medicaid. 79 Yet, despite the enormous 
projected savings, Ohio's governor still was forced to outmaneuver 
the legislature in order to implement the Medicaid expansion in 
Ohio.80 In an effort to make sure only the worthy poor receive aid, 
current efforts to expand Medicaid in Utah include proposals that 
would require expansion recipients to accept the state's help in 
finding work.8l 
76. Id. 
77. Current Status of State Medicaid Expansion Decisions, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 
http://kff.orglhealth-reformlslide/current-status-of-the-medicaid-expansion-decision! 
(last updated Dec .. 17,2014). 
78. See Expanding Medicaid in Ohio: Analysis of Likely Effects, HEALTH POL'y INST. OF 
OHIO 1,6 (Mar. 2013), http://www.healthpolicyohio.orglwp-contentl 
uploads/20 14/0 lImedicaidexpansionstudy _ brieC final_ 022620131.pdf. 
79. See id. at 22; see also Robert Higgs, Ohio Medicaid Costs Expected to be $470 
Million Lower than Anticipated, CLEVELAND. COM (Nov. 7, 2014), 
http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.sstl2014/1I1ohios_medicaid_costs_expected.html 
(attributing lower current Medicaid costs to the state's ability to enroll recipients in 
expanded Medicaid, the cost of which is borne entirely by the federal government). 
80. See State ex rei. Cleveland Right to Life v. State of Ohio Controlling Bd., 3 N.E.3d 
185, 190 (Ohio 2013) (upholding the action of the Ohio Controlling Board granting 
the state Medicaid agency authority to spend federal Medicaid expansion funds). It is 
worth noting that the Controlling Board's approval only lasts until the end of the 
current budget biennium, June 30,2015, raising the possibility that Ohio may re-visit 
its Medicaid expansion decision at that time. See id. 
81. Steve Benen, Utah Poised to Join Medicaid Expansion States, MSNBC (Sept. 12, 
2014, 4:45 PM), http://www.msnbc.comlrachel-maddow-show/utah-poised-joined-
medicaid-expansion-states. 
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It is significant that the Medicaid expansion income methodology 
eliminates one of the oldest storylines in the mythology of the 
deserving and the undeserving poor-the "man-in-the-house" case. 82 
The man-in-the-house case is exemplified by the facts in King v. 
Smith, in which the Supreme Court struck down an Alabama statute 
governing eligibility for cash welfare assistance that attributed the 
income of any man with whom a single woman was cohabiting to the 
household of that woman.83 The statute further defined 
"cohabitation" to include any man and woman having "'frequent or 
continuing' sexual relations," regardless of whether the man lived 
with the woman.84 Specifically, the Court held that while a state 
might wish to discourage "illicit sexual behavior and illegitimacy," it 
could not do so through the statutory scheme setting forth the 
eligibility requirements for cash assistance.85 Despite the Court's 
ruling, states still were permitted to count the income of unrelated 
adults determined to be living in the recipient's household to 
determine Medicaid eligibility, until the implementation of the 
ACA's Medicaid expansion.86 
The Medicaid expansion adopts "Modified Adjusted Gross 
Income" (MAGI)-essentially, the income that would be reported on 
the front page of an individual or family's federal income tax form-
as its sole eligibility criterion.87 By doing so, it eliminates inquiries 
into the recipient's living situation: the only income with which the 
82. See, e.g., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333 (1968) (striking down the Alabama 
eligibility statute for the AFDC program that attributed the income of any man with 
whom a single woman "cohabits" to the household of that woman); King v. Smith, 
392 U.S. 309, 334, 337 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring) (referring to approval of state 
AFDC plans that contain a "man-in-the-house" provision). 
83. Id. at 311-12. 
84. ld. at 313-14. In the case of Ms. Smith, her caseworker determined that she was 
having an affair with a married man and attributed his income to her household even 
though he was not the father of any of her children and lived in a separate household 
with his wife and nine children. ld. at 315. 
85. ld. at 334. 
86. See, e.g., Mississippi Division of Medicaid Eligibility Policies and Procedures Manual 
Chapter 102.08.02, at 1250 (eff. 2009) 
http://www.medicaid.ms.gov/wp-contentluploads/2014/04/Chapterl02Page1250-
1252.pdf (describing how to determine if an unmarried couple is engaged in a 
"holding out" relationship, in which the couple holds itself out to the community as 
married, and explaining that "holding out" couples are considered married for the 
purpose of evaluating financial eligibility for the Aged, Blind and Disabled Medicaid 
program). 
87. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(e)(14) (2012), amended by Act of Mar. 23, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
148, § 2002(a), 124 Stat. 279 (ACA application of the MAGI group to Medicaid). 
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state need be concerned is what is required to be reported on the 
recipient's federal income tax form. 88 The income of unrelated 
adults, even if living in the same household, is not counted. 89 Thus, 
the expansion enables women's sexual autonomy, removing the link 
between access to health care and "appropriate" sexual behavior or 
status as one of the deserving poor. 
B. Private Insurance from a Non-Employer Source: The Individual 
Mandate and Access to the Exchanges 
Along with reducing government control over the behavior of 
Medicaid recipients, the ACA also loosens the overall connection 
between employment and access to health care. In NFIB v. Sebelius, 
the Supreme Court found that the taxing power permitted the federal 
government to compel citizens of the individual states to purchase 
health insurance pursuant to the so-called "individual mandate."9o 
Thus, individuals became responsible for purchasing their own health 
insurance, whether or not they were offered insurance through their 
employer.9\ In this way, the ACA has begun to sever the linkage 
between employment and access to health care. Indeed, the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) reported that implementation of 
"the ACA will reduce the total number of hours worked, on net, by 
about 1.5 percent to 2.0 percent during the period from 2017 to 2024, 
almost entirely because workers will choose to supply less labor ... 
. "92 That is, the ability to obtain access to health care by means 
unrelated to their employment will enable workers to choose to work 
less.93 If the CBO's predictions come to pass, they will mark an 
enormous victory for the ACA. 
88. See id. § 2002, 124 Stat. 279-82. 
89. See generally 26 U.S.C. § 7703 (2012) (providing the option for married individuals 
to jointly file taxes). 
90. Nat'l Fed'n ofIndep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566,2580,2593,2608 (2012). 
91. See id. They, of course, will either have access to Medicaid if they live in a state that 
has chosen to expand Medicaid, or if their income exceeds 100 percent of the Federal 
Poverty Level, the opportunity to purchase insurance through the health care 
marketplaces or exchanges and receive an Advance Premium Tax Credit. See 
Premium Tax Credits: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions, CTR. ON BUDGET & 
POL'y PRIORITIES 1-2 (July 2013), http://www.cbpp.orgifiles/QA-on-Premium-
Credits.pdf. 
92. CONGo BUDGET OFFICE, No. 4869, THE BUDGET & ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 2014 TO 
2024, at 117 (2014). 
93. Id. at 117-18. 
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C. Mandatory Benefits - Requirements for Employers 
Our pre-ACA system of health care did not produce favorable 
health outcomes. 94 Requiring that individuals be disabled or elderly 
in order to receive access to health care through government 
programs has caused the expenditure of a great deal of federal money 
but has largely failed to prevent people from getting sick.9s When an 
applicant must establish an inability to work in order to access 
benefits, the opportunity for prevention likely has been lost. The 
same can be said of employer-based and, therefore, employer-
controlled, health care. 96 Since the inception of employer-based 
health care, employers have been more concerned with having a 
workforce healthy enough to work than with participating in a 
comprehensive, community-based health program designed to protect 
the long-term health of employees.97 
As a part of the notion of "shared responsibility" (requiring all 
actors in the health care system to contribute to near-universal access) 
incorporated in the Affordable Care Act, the employer mandate 
requires employers with fifty or more employees to provide their 
employees with a minimum level of health insurance.98 "Requiring 
all or most employers to provide worker health insurance has been a 
standard feature in universal [health] coverage schemes since 
President Richard Nixon's 1973 plan. "99 Nevertheless, the employer 
mandate has become the latest source of legal controversy during the 
ACA's implementationlOO because it takes away the ability of 
employers to decide whether to provide health insurance and what 
services to cover. 
In addition to imposing the employer mandate, the ACA 
established new requirements for "group health plan[s]" that fall 
94. See, e.g., Editorial, The Shame of American Health Care, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17,2013), 
http://www.nytimes.coml20 13/11I18/opinionithe-shame-of-american-heaith-
care.html. 
95. See STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION, supra note I, at 1. 
96. See The Shame of American Health Care, supra note 94. While the Inland Steel 
decision gave unions a voice in the administration of health benefit plans beginning in 
the late 1940s, the decline of unionized employment across the country has led to a 
decline in the ability of workers to influence the operation of their health benefit 
plans. See STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 7, at 313. 
97. See STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION,SUpra note 7, at 315. 
98. See McDONOUGH, supra note 8, at 131-33. 
99. Id. at 131. 
100. See, e.g., Casey B. Mulligan, The Myth of ObamaCare's Affordability, WALL ST. J. 
(Sept. 8, 2014, 7:20 PM), http://online.wsj.comlarticles/casey-b-mulligan-the-myth-
of-obamacares-affordability-141 0218437. 
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within the meaning of Internal Revenue Code Section 5000(b)(I).101 
On July 19, 2010, the Department of Labor, the Department of Health 
and Human Services, and the Department of the Treasury issued 
interim final rules implementing the rules for group health plans 
regarding preventive health services. 102 Like the statute, the interim 
final rules required that plans cover preventive care as provided for in 
guidelines supported by the Health Resources and Services 
Administration (HRSA).103 HRSA ultimately delegated the creation 
of the guidelines on this issue to the Institute of Medicine (10M). 104 
On August 1, 2011, HRSA issued guidelines defining the preventive 
services to be provided pursuant to the ACA's requirements. 105 The 
guidelines required that preventive services include "[a]l1 Food and 
Drug Administration [(FDA)] approved contraceptive methods, 
sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling for all 
women with reproductive capacity."106 
An employer offering to its employees a group health plan that fails 
to provide the required coverage, including required contraceptive 
coverage, thus became subject to a penalty of $100 per day for each 
affected individual, beginning with the first plan year beginning on or 
after January 1, 2014. 107 This has been called the contraception 
mandate. 108 It is to be distinguished from the employer mandate that 
requires larger employers to provide "full-time employees (and their 
dependents) the opportunity to enroll in minimum essential coverage 
under an eligible employer-sponsored plan" or face annual excise tax 
penalties of $2000 per full-time employee. 109 
This requirement generated a fire storm of protest, as the Obama 
administration struggled to find a way to maintain the contraception 
101. 26 u.s.c. § 5000(b)(I) (2012); Interim Rules for Group Health Plans and Health 
Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventative Services, 75 Fed. Reg. 41,726, 
41,726-28 (July 19,2010) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147). 
102. Interim Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to 
Coverage of Preventative Services, 75 Fed. Reg. at 41,726. 
103. Id. at 41,731, 41,733; see 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(f)(I). 
104. See Women's Preventive Services Guidelines, HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVS. ADMIN., 
(citing Institute of Medicine: CLINICAL PREVENTIVE SERVICES FOR WOMEN: CLOSING 
THE GAPS (The Nat'l Academies Press 2011)), www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines (last 
visited Jan. 11,2015). 
105. Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of 
Preventative Services, 77 Fed. Reg. 8,725, 8,725 (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 
29 C.F.R. pt. 2590,45 C.F.R. pt. 147). 
106. Id 
107. See 26 U.S.C. § 4980B note (2012); 26 U.S.C. § 4980D(b), (e)(l) (2012). 
108. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
109. See 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a), (c)(l). 
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mandate while accommodating religious employers.llo On February 
10,2012, the administration created a "Temporary Enforcement Safe 
Harbor" that applied to group health plans sponsored by nonprofit 
organizations that on and after February 10, 2012, do not provide 
some or all of the contraception coverage required by rule. IliOn July 
2, 2013, the administration issued the final rule to implement the 
contraception mandate as it applies to religious employers.112 
Under the final rule, "religious employers" are exempt from the 
mandate if they are churches and religious orders "organized and 
operate [ d] as . . . nonprofit entit[ ies] . . . referred to in section 
6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Internal Revenue Code," as are certain 
otherwise non-exempt religious organizations defined as "eligible 
organizations."ll3 Thus, the final rule includes an "accommodation" 
for non-profit organizations that hold themselves out as religious and 
oppose birth control for religious reasons. ll4 Such non-profit 
organizations do not have to provide contraceptive coverage in their 
health insurance plans; instead, their employees will receive this 
benefit directly from their insurance company.llS 
Given our national history of allowing employers to define "health" 
for their employees,116 it should not be surprising that there was 
resistance to governmental attempts to require that specific forms of 
preventive care be made available by all employers. Thus, despite 
the Obama administration's efforts at accommodation, a number of 
lawsuits were filed.117 In total, some 91 challenges were filed against 
the contraception mandate, 46 from for-profit companies, and 45 
110. See infra notes 116-120. 
111. Certain Preventative Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 16,501, 
16,501-{)3 (Mar. 21, 2012) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54,29 C.F.R. pt. 2590,45 
C.F.R. pt. 147). 
112. Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 
39,870, 39,870 (July 2, 2013) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54,29 C.F.R. pts. 2510, 
2590,45 C.F.R. pts. 147, 156). 
113. 45 C.F.R.§ 147.131(a)-(b)(4) (2013) (defining religious employers and eligible 
organizations). The regulations exempt more than 335,000 religious organizations, 
including churches and synagogues, from the contraceptive-coverage requirement. § 
147.131(a); 158 CONGo REc. S375, S375, S377, S379 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 2012) 
(statements of Sen. Jeanne Shaheen, Sen. Barbara Boxer, Sen. Dianne Feinstein). 
114. 45 C.F.R. § 147.13 I (b)(1)-(4). 
115. Id. § 147.131(a), (c)(2). 
116. See supra notes 21-26, 34-40, and accompanying text. 
117. Andrea Flynn, In Contraceptive Mandate Challenges, Women's Health and Much 
More is on the Line, NEXT NEW DEAL (Jan. 13,2014), 
http://www.nextnewdeal.netlcontraceptive-rnandate-challenges-
women%E2%80%99s-health-and-much-more-line. 
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from non-profit organizations. liB Those receiving the most attention 
were those filed by for-profit corporations that asserted that forcing 
them to provide contraception benefits without cost sharing to their 
employees violated their right to religious liberty guaranteed by the 
Free Exercise Clause1l9 and the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act. 120 
In the most prominent of these cases, the plaintiff, Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc., a closely held corporation, argued for an exemption from 
the contraception mandate because requiring it to offer certain types 
of birth control to its workers violated the religious conscience of its 
owners as expressed through the operation of the corporation. 121 The 
plaintiffs in Hobby Lobby included the five members of the Green 
family and the two businesses that they own: "Hobby Lobby Stores, 
an arts-and-crafts chain, and Mardel, a chain of Christian 
bookstores." 122 The businesses occupy over 500 stores and employ 
more than 13,000 full-time employees.123 Hobby Lobby has annual 
sales of $3 billion. 124 Neither Hobby Lobby nor Mardel is 
unionized. 125 
Similar claims ultimately were advanced by a variety of businesses 
that engage in various forms of non-religious commerce, such as 
selling outdoor power equipment,126 recycling scrap metal,127 and 
118. [d. 
119. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise 
[of religion]."). 
120. Irin Cannon, Supreme Court Takes Up Birth Control Cases, MSNBC (Nov. 27, 2013, 
3:30 PM), http://www.msnbc.comlthe-Iast-wordlbirth-control-courts-hands; Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012). 
121. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114,1120-21 (10th Cir. 2013), aff'd, 
134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
122. Brief for Respondents at *1, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 
(2014) (No. 13-354),2013 WL 5720377, at *1. 
123. [d. 
124. America's Largest Private Companies, Hobby Lobby Stores, FORBES, 
http://www.forbes.comlcompanieslhobby-Iobby-stores/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2015). 
Its owner, David Green, is number 310 in Forbes Magazine's list of the wealthiest 
people in the United States. He has a net worth of 4.5 billion dollars. Profile, David 
Green, FORBES http://www.forbes.comlprofile/david-greenl (last visited Jan. II, 
2015). 
125. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 122, at *1-2. 
126. Legatus v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980,986 (E.D. Mich. 2012). 
127. Am. Pulverizer Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 12-3459-CV-S-
RED, 2012 WL 6951316, at *2 (W.O. Mo. Dec. 20, 2012), appeal dismissed, No. 13-
1395 (8th Cir. Sept. 4, 2014). 
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manufacturing wood cabinets,128 vehicle safety systems,129 and 
HV AC equipment. 130 These challenges subsequently were addressed 
by the Supreme Court in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., and 
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Burwell, 13l two cases in which 
the appellate courts had reached opposite results regarding the 
applicability of the contraception mandate to for-profit corporations 
asserting religious objections.132 
III. RECENT ACA LITIGATION: HOBBY LOBBY AND ITS 
COUSINS 
Despite these cases' focus on the exercise of religion, the same 
health care themes persist: the employer's desire to define health and 
the use of health care as a means to control the behavior of workers 
versus government intervention requiring health care to be provided 
to the "unworthy" or "undeserving." In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc., the Supreme Court came down squarely on the side of 
allowing employers to continue to define "health" for their 
employees, holding that "the contraceptive mandate, as applied to 
closely held corporations, violates RFRA [Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act]."133 
A. Hobby Lobby and Free Exercise: When Discrimination is Not 
Discrimination 
In the majority opinion, Justice Alito rejected the argument that the 
owners of closely held companies were not protected in their free 
exercise of religion by RFRA, even when acting as corporations. 134 
Moreover, he found that a less restrictive alternative, the 
accommodation developed for religious non-profits, could be applied 
to closely held corporations to bring the mandate within the 
128. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 
724 F.3d 377, 381-82 (3d Cir. 2013), rev'd, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 
134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). Conestoga, of course, was ultimately consolidated for 
hearing with Hobby Lobby before the Supreme Court. 
129. Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 850, 852 (7th Cir. 2013). 
130. Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1292 (D. Colo. 2012), aff'd, 542 F. 
App'x 706 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2902 (2014). 
131. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2755 (2014). 
132. Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 377; Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 
1116 (10th Cir. 2013), aff'd, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 
(2014). 
133. 134 S. Ct. at 2785. 
134. See id. at 2772-73. 
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requirements of RFRA. 135 Further, the Court determined that closely 
held, for-profit corporations are "persons" intended to be protected by 
RFRA.136 To reach this conclusion, Justice Alito emphasized the fact 
that HHS conceded that a non-profit corporation can be a person 
within the meaning of RFRA, noting that the profit motive does not 
prevent corporations from engaging in charitable and religious 
activities. 137 
While the Court's decision is notable because it extends the 
protections of RFRA to corporations, its greatest significance may lie 
in its restoration of power to employers to define "health" and 
determine the health care needs of their employees. Tellingly, the 
Court affords almost complete deference to the asserted religious 
beliefs of the plaintiffs. 138 "[I]n these cases, the Hahns and Greens 
and their companies sincerely believe that providing the insurance 
coverage demanded by the HHS regulations lies on the forbidden side 
of the line, and it is not for us to say that their religious beliefs are 
mistaken or insubstantial. "139 This effectively gives away the entire 
game, as the Court essentially claims that its "narrow function" is 
only to determine whether the employer's definition of health reflects 
an honest religious conviction. 140 
In conducting its RFRA analysis, the Court assumed that the 
government had a compelling interest in guaranteeing cost-free 
access to contraception. 141 However, it appears to have done so 
primarily to avoid talking about contraception as a gender 
discrimination issue. 142 This approach is not lost on Justice Ginsburg 
who, in response, leads the first section of her dissenting opinion with 
the words: "'The ability of women to participate equally in the 
economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their 
ability to control their reproductive lives. "'143 Indeed, while Justice 
Ginsburg provides an estimate of the cost of an intra-uterine device 
(IUD) in her opinion,l44 Justice Alito refuses to rely on amici for such 
information and blames HHS for failing to provide any estimate of 
135. ld. at 2780. 
136. ld. at 2769. 
137. Id. at 2770-71. 
138. !d. at 2779. 
139. Id. 
140. ld. at 2757 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 
716 (1981)). 
141. Id. at 2780. 
142. See id. at 2779. 
143. Id. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. 
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992)). 
144. Id. at 2800 n.22. 
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the average cost per employee of contraception or of the number of 
employees who might be affected because they work for corporations 
like Hobby Lobby and Conestoga. 145 As a result, his is an opinion 
which asserts strongly that a religious employer may discriminate 
against women in defining what health care it will provide for its 
employees but which simultaneously insists that it does not overrule 
any anti-discrimination statutes-at least, not any regarding race. 146 
Certainly, it remains to be seen whether the Americans with 
Disabilities Act,147 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,148 the Fair Labor 
Standards Act,149 and the Federal Occupational Safety and Health 
Actl50 will be subject to a future challenges based on RFRA.151 
Until Hobby Lobby, it had been the rule that '''[t]he First 
Amendment ... gives no one the right to insist that, in pursuit of their 
own interests, others must conform their conduct to his own religious 
necessities. "'152 Again, however, our recurring national health care 
themes appear to have trumped all prior precedent. Thus, the Hobby 
Lobby decision grants employers a unique religious license, in that 
they can impose a kind of tax on the employees who do not share 
their beliefs. 153 
In their brief, the owners of Conestoga Wood Specialties 
complained of being required to "purchase religiously objectionable 
products for others' use."154 However, granting them a conscientious 
exemption to the contraception mandate imposes on the conscience 
of their company's 950 employees. 155 In their briefs before the Court, 
both Hobby Lobby and Conestoga sought to diminish this argument 
by emphasizing that their religious beliefs are well known and 
permeate their business practices, implying that employees who do 
145. Id. at 2776 (majority opinion). 
146. See id. at 2783. 
147. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (2012). 
148. 42 U.S.c. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012). 
149. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2012). 
150. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2012). 
151. See Caroline Mala Corbin, Corporate Religious Liberty 45-46 (Aug. 2013) 
(unpublished working paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm? 
abstract id=2327919. 
152. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Otten v. BaIt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1953». 
153. See Frederick Mark Gedicks & Andrew Koppelman, Invisible Women: Why an 
Exemption/or Hobby Lobby Would Violate the Establishment Clause, 67 VAND. L. 
REV. EN BANe 51, 57-59 (2014). 
154. Brief for Petitioners at 14-15, Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 134 S. 
Ct. 678 (2014) (No. 13-356),2014 WL 173487. 
155. See Corbin, supra note 151, at 43. 
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not share those beliefs are not likely to want to be employed by their 
companies. 156 However, if that were true, then there would be no 
need to oppose the contraception mandate. In accordance with the 
owners' views, no employees would seek to purchase the 
contraceptives, and there would be no danger of the owners having to 
purchase religiously objectionable products. In fact, economic reality 
dictates that the owners' claims are not true: their employees hold 
diverse religious beliefs, some of which conflict with their own. 157 
Herein lies the chief problem with corporate religious freedom: the 
disparity in power between the owners of large corporations and their 
employees makes it likely that wealthy owners will enjoy religious 
liberty, but their employees will not. 158 Under the Court's decision, 
the Hahns and the Greens now may exercise their religious freedom 
by reaching into some of the most intimate details of their 
employees' lives and by dictating certain behaviors. While both 
families have insisted that they want to provide health insurance to 
their employees and wish only to impose the limitations dictated by 
their conscience and faith, I 59 this is merely another method of 
drawing a distinction between the deserving and "undeserving poor." 
As noted earlier, "[t]he undeserving poor have a very old history. 
They represent the enduring attempt to classify poor people by 
merit."160 Characterizing lower class or working class individuals as 
morally suspect and, particularly, sexually promiscuous, has been an 
American tradition. 161 Implicit in the notion that employees of 
Hobby Lobby and Conestoga share the religious views of their 
employer is the idea that good employees will seek to work their way 
156. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 154, at 12; Brief for Respondents, supra note 
122, at 8-9, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 678 (No. 13-354),2014 
WL 546899. 
157. See Corbin, supra note 151, at 43-44. 
158. ld. 
159. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 154, at 5; Brief for Respondents, supra note 122, 
at 9-10. 
160 . KATZ, supra note 33, at 1. 
161. See id. at 2; see also Aaron Blake, Huckabee: Dems Think Women Can '/ Control 
Their Libido, WASH. POST (Jan. 23,2014), http://www.washingtonpost.comlblogs/ 
post-politics/wp/2014/01/23lhuckabee-dems-think-women-cant-control-their-libidol 
("If the Democrats want to insult the women of America by making them believe that 
they are helpless without Uncle Sugar coming in and providing for them a 
prescription each month for birth control because they cannot control their libido or 
their reproductive system without the help of the govemment, then so be it .... " 
(quoting Mike Huckabee)). This quote reveals "biological citizenship" writ large. 
Government health care carries such a stigma that, in Mr. Huckabee's view, offering it 
to someone is an insult. See supra Part I.D. 
2015 ACA as Anti-Subordination Legislation 223 
up in society by emulating their bosses, who once more have the 
authority to define their employees' health. 
B. The Little Sisters of the Poor Cases 
In its decision in Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court left open 
the possibility of a second type of successful challenge to the ACA's 
contraception mandate. 162 Those cases are still working their way 
through the lower COurtS. 163 Instead of for-profit corporations, these 
cases involve non-profit religious organizations that do not meet the 
162. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2782 (2014) ("We do not 
decide today whether an approach of this type complies with RFRA for purposes of 
all religious claims."). Indeed, three days after the decision in Hobby Lobby was 
issued, the Court temporarily enjoined the religious non-profit accommodation in 
Wheaton College v. Burwell. Wheaton Coli. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2807 
(2014). In its order, the Court exempts Wheaton College, a religious non-profit, from 
having to comply with the self-certification procedure mandated by the 
accommodation. Id. Instead, Wheaton is required merely to inform the government 
that it is exempt from the contraception mandate. Id. Coming so soon after the 
Court's decision in Hobby Lobby, in which Justice Kennedy premised his decisive 
concurrence on the existence of the religious non-profit exemption as a less restrictive 
means of fulfilling the government's interest in ensuring women's access to necessary 
preventive care, the Wheaton College injunction inspired a blistering dissent from 
Justice Sotomayor. Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Adam Liptak, Birth Control 
Order Deepens Divide Among Justices, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2014) 
http://www.nytimes.coml20 14/07 /04/us(politics(supreme-court-order -suspends-
contraception-rule-for-christian-college.html. Justice Alito's Hobby Lobby opinion, 
coupled with Justice Kennedy's concurrence, briefly had seemed to suggest that the 
accommodation procedure for religious non-profits would meet with the Court's 
approval when the cases addressing it reached the Court. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 
2763; id. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The Wheaton College injunction 
suggests otherwise. Id. 
163. The cases involving religious non-profits largely focus on the mechanics of the 
process by which those entities can claim an exclusion from the contraception 
mandate. See, e.g., Little Sisters of the Poor v. Sebelius, No. 13-CV-2611-WJM-
BNB, 2013 WL 6839900, at *8 (D. Colo. Dec. 27, 2013) (order denying injunction), 
appeal docketed, No. 13-1540. (lOth Cir. Dec. 27,2013), injunction granted pending 
appeal, 134 S. Ct. 1022 (Jan. 24, 2014) (mem.) (order issuing injunction pending 
appeal in the Tenth Circuit). Plaintiffs in those cases contend that the process of 
certifying that they are exempt organizations is unacceptable because the certification 
then enables employees to seek access to contraception through third party insurance 
companies. Id. at *3. In Little Sisters of the Poor, the Court enjoined the Government 
from requiring the plaintiffs to comply with the contraception mandate while the case 
is pending in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Little Sisters 
of the Poor, 134 S. Ct. at 1022 (2014) (order granting injunction pending final 
disposition of the appeal). 
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definition of religious employers.l64 In one such case, for example, 
the plaintiffs, the Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged in 
Denver, Colorado; the Little Sisters of the Poor, Baltimore, 
Maryland; Christian Brothers Services; and Christian Brothers 
Employee Benefit Trust, filed a class action lawsuit in the United 
States District Court for the District of Colorado. 165 The complaint 
defines the proposed class as those employers: 
(i) that have adopted or in the future adopt the Christian 
Brothers Employee Benefit Trust to provide medical 
coverage for their "employees" or former employees and 
their dependents ... (ii) that are or could be reasonably 
construed to be "eligible organizations" within the meaning 
of the [final rule on the mandate] . . . and (iii) are not 
"religious employers" within the meaning of the [final rule 
on the mandate]. 166 
Like other non-profit religious organizations, the plaintiffs argue 
that providing the certification that would exempt them from 
complying with the contraception mandate makes them participants 
in the sin in which their employees engage by using birth control. 167 
What appears to be significant about the Little Sisters of the Poor 
case, however, can be gleaned from the complaint and its definition 
of the class. 168 By constructing a class that includes only employers 
that adopt or will adopt the Christian Brothers Employee Benefit 
Trust as their benefits administrator, the plaintiffs and their counsel 
announce their commercial intentions. 169 The real fear of the 
Christian Brothers Employee Benefit Trust appears to be not that it 
will be forced to comply with the contraception mandate,170 but rather 
164. See, e.g., Little Sisters o/the Poor, 2013 WL 6839900, at *2-3, *8 (holding that the 
plaintiffs faU under the classification of "eligible organizations" rather than "religious 
employers"). 
165. Id. at *l. 
166. Complaint at 4, Little Sisters of the Poor v. Sebelius, 2013 WL 6839900 (D. Colo. 
2013) (No. 1:13CV02611). 
167. See Little Sisters o/the Poor, 2013 WL 6839900, at *9. 
168. Little Sisters o/the Poor, Complaint, supra note 166, at l. 
169. See id. at *4. 
170. In denying the injunction ultimately granted by Justice Sotomayor, the Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit noted that aU of the plaintiff entities in the case would 
be exempt from the contraception mandate. Little Sisters of the Poor v. Sebelius, No. 
13-1540 (lOth Cir. Dec. 31, 2013) (order denying preliminary injunction), injunction 
granted pending appeal, 134 S. Ct. 1022 (2014). 
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that implementation of the ACA's mandate will put it out of 
business. 171 
The Christian Brothers Employee Benefit Trust has developed a 
niche market providing health benefits to Catholic non-profits that 
wish to provide health insurance to their employees while remaining 
in compliance with Catholic teachings prohibiting coverage for 
contraception, sterilization, abortifacients, and related education and 
counseling.172 The Trust covers more than 5,000 active employees at 
more than 200 Catholic employers.173 If the contraception mandate is 
upheld because of the accommodation for non-profit religious 
organizations, there would no longer be a market for the Trust's 
services. 174 If the Little Sisters case reaches the Supreme Court, it 
may present the question of whether RFRA requires the government 
to protect the market share of non-profit religious organizations that 
enable religious non-profits to define health and appropriate health 
care for their employees. 
C. Halbig and its Threat to the A CA 
Despite, or perhaps because of, predictions such as those made by 
the CBO,175 employers seem determined to resist relinquishing the 
power that their longstanding control over employee access to 
healthcare has provided them. Another line of cases has arrived at 
the Supreme Court under the caption King v. Burwell. 176 It was 
thought that the Supreme Court would wait to weigh in on the issues 
raised in King until there was a split between United States Circuit 
Courts of Appeal. 177 Such a split had been anticipated after Halbig v. 
Burwell, in which the plaintiffs sought to eliminate tax subsidies for 
low-income individuals who purchase health insurance through the 
171. Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Preliminary Injunction at *3, Little Sisters of the 
Poor, 134 S. Ct. 1022 (2014) (No. 13A691), 2014 WL IOS373. 
172. Little Sisters of the Poor, Complaint, supra note 166, at *4. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. at *2. 
175. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text. 
176. Case No. 14-114. On November 7,2014, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
the King case, with oral arguments expected to be held in March 2015 and a decision 
expected by late Jlme or early July 2015. 
177. See Adam Liptak, Justices to Hear New Challenge to Health Law, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
7, 2014), http://www.nytimes.coml20 1411110S/us/politics/supreme-court-to-hear-new-
challenge-to-health-law.html. 
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federal exchange. 178 The plaintiffs in Halbi~ lost in federal district 
court,179 but won their appeal before a three-judge panel in the Court 
of Appeals. 180 On the same day that the three-judge panel in Halbi~ 
issued its ruling striking down the challenged regulation, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit issued an opinion in 
King v. Burwell, upholding the challenged regulation. 181 However, 
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia chose to re-
hear the Halbig case en bane and vacated the decision in favor of the 
plaintiffs. 182 Undeterred by the loss of this circuit split, the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to address the subsidy issue raised in both 
Kin~ and Halbi~, and perhaps seize the opportunity to take 
subsidized health care away from millions of Americans who have 
enjoyed receiving it under the ACA.183 
While the cases before the Court raise the same issues, Halbig is 
emblematic of the underlying struggle. Both the identity of some 
parties and the convoluted theory of the case convey the stubbornness 
with which employers continue to challenge the ACA, seeking to 
wrest their control of access to health care back from the federal 
government. In Halbi~, a former senior policy adviser to the 
Department of Health and Human Services under President George 
W. Bush filed suit, along with (among others) one of the former 
plaintiffs in NFIB v. Sebelius, in order to challenge U.S. Treasury 
regulation 26 C.F.R. ~ 1.36B-2(a), issued pursuant to the ACA.184 
The challenged regulation provides that lower income individuals 
seeking to purchase insurance through the federal exchanges are 
entitled to receive subsidies paid through the tax system to defray the 
178. Halbig v. Sebelius, No. 13-623,2014 WL 129023, at *1, *4 (D.D.C. Jan. 15,2014), 
rev'd, 758 F. 3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 2014), and reh 'g en banc granted, judgment vacated, 
No. 14-5018,2014 WL 4627181 (Sept. 4, 2014). 
179. Halbig v. Sebelius, No. 13-623,2014 WL 129023, at *1, *4 (D.D.C. Jan. 15,2014), 
rev'd, 758 F. 3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 2014), and reh 'g en banc granted, judgment vacated, 
No. 14-5018,2014 WL 4627181 (Sept. 4, 2014). 
180. Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 2014), reh'g en banc granted, judgment 
vacated, No. 14-5018,2014 WL 4627181 (Sept. 4, 2014). 
181. Halbig, 758 F.3d 390; King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 2014). 
182. Halbig v. Sebelius, No. 13-623,2014 WL 129023, at *1, *4 (D.D.C. Jan. 15,2014), 
rev'd, 758 F. 3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 2014), and reh 'g en banc granted, judgment vacated, 
No. 14-5018,2014 WL 4627181 (Sept. 4, 2014). 
183. LINDA 1. BLUMBERG, JOHN HOLAHAN & MATTHEW BERGMAN, HALBIG v BURWELL: 
POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR ACA COVERAGE AND SUBSIDIES 1-2 (Urban Inst. et al. 
eds., 2014), available at http://www.taxpolicycenter.orglUploadedPDF/413183-
Halbig-v-Burwell-Potential-Implications-for-ACA-Coverage-and-Subsidies.pdf 
(estimating that 7.3 million people could lose subsidies if the plaintiffs in Halbig 
ultimately prevail). 
184. See Complaint ~ 4, Halbig, 2014 WL 129023 (No. 13-623),2013 WL 1874720. 
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cost of purchasing insurance. 185 The plaintiffs claim that the 
challenged regulation exceeds the authority granted by the ACA, 
which they contend allows the federal government to provide tax 
subsidies only to individuals who purchase insurance "through an 
Exchange established by a State."186 Further, they assert that the 
challenged regulation harms them because the availability of tax 
subsidies enables the federal government to enforce both the 
employer mandate and the individual mandate. 187 More specifically, 
they allege that, without the availability of subsidies, the federal 
government could not compel individuals to purchase health 
insurance because it would be unaffordable without the subsidies. 188 
In addition, the federal government could not force large employers 
to provide their employees with health care and impose fines if they 
receive subsidies from the exchange if subsidies cannot be 
provided. 189 Thus, the theory presented by the plaintiffs in the new 
Supreme Court cases neatly entwines the roles of state government 
and employers in controlling the access of workers to health care: by 
refusing to establish its own exchange, through which employees 
could purchase health insurance independently from their employers, 
a state government can ensure that employers are not subject to the 
employer mandate and that the individual mandate will not be 
enforceable. Workers again will be left to look to the beneficence of 
their employers or their state government to have access to health 
care. 
IV. ENABLING A NEW PATH: CASTING THE ACA AS ANTI-
SUBORDINA TION LEGISLATION 
Path dependence arises from history. Past choices influence and 
define present and future ones. This process creates narrative, as 
justifications must be developed for ongoing reliance on past 
precedents. 190 As has been shown above, the health care narratives 
that define our system are extraordinarily powerful. Thus, in order to 
185. Treas. Reg. § 1.36B-2(a) (2013). 
186. Halbig, Complaint, supra note 184, '\1'\129, 40. 
187. Id. '\17. 
188. Id. '\15. 
189. Id. '\16. 
190. See generally HARRIET A. WASHINGTON, MEDICAL APARTHEID: THE DARK HISTORY OF 
MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION ON BLACK AMERICANS FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE 
PRESENT passim (2006) (discussing in detail scientific racism-experiments and 
supposed research intended to confirm the inferiority of blacks). 
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prevail in the new sets of challenges to the ACA, advocates must 
develop new narratives. 
Those narratives can be developed by explaining the "why" of the 
ACA. The statute alters the status quo, imposing change and 
regulation in myriad ways. But why is that change necessary? One 
need only review the President's botched promise that, "if you like 
your health care, you can keep it," to comprehend Americans' grave 
discomfort with, if not fear of, change in their health care system. 191 
Accordingly, it can only help the implementation of the ACA to 
explain why the changes it requires are necessary. As described in 
Parts I and II, so much of what defines our health care system results 
from our national history of racial and gender animus. l92 The only 
way to overcome that past is to acknowledge its role in creating our 
system and then to take conscious steps away from it. Anti-
subordination theory193 offers an approach to doing so. 
"[S]lavery was an exploitative economic relationship based on the 
ideology of racial supremacy . . .. "194 During Reconstruction, 
Congress sought to address the link between economic exploitation 
and race, but failed to prevent the rise of the Jim Crow system in the 
South. 195 Throughout much of the twentieth century, "blacks 
experienced the same pattern of racial and economic subordination 
that had characterized the institution of slavery."196 Even after 
numerous civil rights victories in the courts and Congress, as well as 
the election of an African American President, African Americans 
still have lower life expectancies and health outcomes than whites, 
and women still have lower salaries and pay more for preventive 
health care than men. 197 The concept of "anti-subordination" seeks to 
191. Press Release, President Barack Obama, Statement by the President on the Affordable 
Care Act (Nov. 14, 2013, 12:02 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013111114/statement-president-affordable-care-act. Many individuals who 
received notices that they could not keep their current health plans objected angrily, 
even when they learned that they could obtain better coverage more cheaply through 
the federal marketplaces and subsidies established by the ACA. Id. 
192. See supra notes 30-32,65-67 and accompanying text. 
193. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Anti-subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal 
Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1003, 1007-10 (1986). 
194. Rebecca E. Zietlow, Free at Last! Anti-subordination and the Thirteenth Amendment, 
90 B.U. L. REv. 255, 263 (2010). 
195. Id. at 277,286-87. 
196. Id. at 263. 
197. Brian D. Camozzi, Health Care Access, 11 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 443,483 (2010); 
Ruqaiijah Yearby, Breaking the Cycle of "Unequal Treatment" with Health Care 
Reform: Acknowledging and Addressing the Continuation of Racial Bias, 44 CONN. L. 
REv. 1281, 1283-84, 1292 (2012). 
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end "race or gender based practices that further the subordination of 
those who have suffered a history of discrimination."198 Thus, 
because the ACA challenges path dependence and loosens the links 
between employment and access to health care, its implementation is 
an anti-subordination project. 
A. Taking Back the Narrative 
At times, the Obama Administration's defense of the ACA has 
seemed far too timid. 199 If the Administration really wants to change 
our health care system, it has to stand up for the ACA. It needs to 
speak directly and forcefully about what is in issue in the ACA: the 
right of individuals to define health for themselves and seek 
appropriate care without fear of jeopardizing their employment. For 
example, the amicus brief for the National Women's Law Center in 
Conestoga Wood Specialties includes the following statements: 
Employers that exclude women's preventive health services 
from their health insurance plans while covering men's 
preventive services discriminate against women. Such 
exclusion means that women are denied the comprehensive 
preventive health coverage provided to men. Moreover, 
when effective contraception is not used, and unintended 
pregnancy results, it is women who incur the attendant 
physical burdens and medical risks of pregnancy, women 
who disproportionately bear the health care costs of 
pregnancy and childbirth, and women who often face 
barriers to employment and educational opportunities as a 
result of pregnancy. 200 
There is nothing so straightforward and direct in the Solicitor 
General's briefs.201 Indeed, in its response brief in the Conestoga 
Wood Specialties case, the Government expressed repeatedly that the 
Hahns' beliefs were sincere.202 Taking such a defensive posture 
198. See Zietlow, supra note 194, at 266 n.63. 
199. See Koeninger, supra note 10, at 177 n.276 (criticizing the administration for failing 
to argue that the ACA was a civil rights enactment in NFIB v. Sebelius). 
200. Brief for the National Women's Law Center & Sixty-Eight Other Organizations as 
Amici Curiae in Support of the Government at 20, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (Nos. 13-354, 13-356),2014 WL 333895, at *20. 
201. Brieffor the Petitioners, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) 
(No. 13-354),2014 WL 173486; Brief for the Respondents, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-356),2014 WL 546900. 
202. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 201, at I, 7-8. 
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turned out to be no way to shift the focus from wealthy employers to 
their employees. 
Quite simply, the Government seems to have failed to understand 
the significance of severing the link between access to health care 
and employment. As Justice Alito noted, the Government apparently 
did not raise the question of whether the employers could have 
complied with their consciences more cheaply by dropping insurance 
and paying the fines than by purchasing insurance for their 
employees that excluded contraception coverage.203 Justice Alito also 
points out that HHS failed to provide an estimate of the average cost 
per employee of providing access to contraceptives or statistics.204 
Without these numbers, it was impossible to convey the impact of the 
free exercise tax that female employees of businesses like Hobby 
Lobby must pay to support their employers' free exercise of 
religion.205 
In its Petitioner's brief, Conestoga Woods actually argued that 
requiring a corporation to provide access to birth control in its 
employee health plan amounts to government interference in the lives 
of citizens.206 Moreover, the company argued that a woman's attempt 
to secure access to preventive care through her employee health plan 
is an infringement on the rights of her corporate bosses.207 According 
to Conestoga Wood Specialties, Title VII has no applicability in the 
case.20S Apparently, the Court also accepted this argument.209 
Thus, one can only conclude that the corporate opponents of the 
ACA have stolen the debate from the government. The strategy 
employed by Conestoga should have been anticipated by ACA 
supporters. During the oral arguments for NFIB v. Sebelius, Justice 
Kennedy famously asked: 
I understand that we must presume laws are constitutional, 
but, even so, when you are changing the relation of the 
individual to the government in this, what we can stipulate 
203. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2776. 
204. Id. at 2780-81. In fact, it is Justice Ginsberg's dissent that notes that IUDs can cost 
women more than $1000. Id. at 2800 n.22 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). 
205. See Gedicks & Koppelman, supra note 153, at 57-59 (describing the costs imposed 
on Hobby Lobby employees by the company's beliefs). 
206. Brief for the Petitioners at 49-50, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 
2751 (2014) (No. 13-356),2014 WL 173487. 
207. See id. 
208. Id. at 50. 
209. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2773-74. 
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is, I think, a unique way, do you not have a heavy burden of 
justification to show authorization under the Constitution?210 
231 
Eventually, Justice Roberts referenced this language in his opinion, 
finding that the Government had not met this burden of justification 
and that the individual mandate could not be justified under the 
commerce power.211 In doing so, Justice Roberts seemed to suggest 
that the rights of individuals should be more highly valued than 
having a coherent, sustainable health care system that benefits 
everyone.212 Thus, Justice Roberts arguably emboldened those 
seeking to opt out of other mandatory aspects of the ACA. Ironically, 
this encouragement seems to have empowered only wealthy 
individuals, corporations, and religious organizations, not ordinary 
citizens.213 Advocates for the ACA need to find ways to make the 
ACA implementation cases about the rights of those who will benefit 
from the ACA as it addresses the unfinished business of civil rights. 
B. Going on the Offensive 
Rather than scrambling to defend the ACA from death by a 
thousand cuts,214 ACA supporters need to find ways to affirmatively 
support and promote it. While supporters of refusal clauses and other 
restrictions view them as matters of providers' rights of conscience, 
210. Transcript of Oral Argument at 11-12, Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. 
Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov 
loral_ arguments/argument_ transcripts/ll-398-Tuesday.pdf. 
211. See Nat 'I Fed'n oflndep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2591. 
212. Indeed, in their Brief, counsel for Hobby Lobby mock the notion that the government 
has an interest in insuring a "comprehensive insurance system," claiming that the 
government already has permitted so many exceptions and opt-outs that a 
comprehensive system is impossible. Brieffor Respondents, supra note 122, at 34. 
213. In a sense, Justice Kennedy's jurisprudence is now at war with itself. On the one 
hand, the government may not use its commerce power to compel an individual to 
purchase health insurance. See Nat 'I Fed'n oflndep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2648 (Scalia, 
Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, Jl, dissenting). But, on the other hand, corporations, in 
accordance with the religious beliefs of their owners, can use the economic power that 
corporate ownership provides them to deny individual women access to recommended 
preventive care. See Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2785 (Kennedy, l, concurring). Justice 
Kennedy either appears to believe somewhat naively that corporations are a more 
benign force than the federal government or that the extent to which one can exercise 
individual rights should be dependent on personal wealth-hardly a position 
consistent with the "fundamental proposition 'that all men are created equal .... ", 
Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., III U.S. 746, 762 (1884) (Bradley, J., 
concurring) (quoting THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776)). 
214. See supra Parts III.B., III.C. 
232 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW Vol. 44 
they can have significant negative consequences for women's health 
and lead to poorer health outcomes.215 This needs to be publicized 
and discussed. Commentators have noted that "[t]he most depressing 
aspect of discussions surrounding the Hobby Lobby litigation is the 
total failure to acknowledge the women who would be harmed by 
RFRA exemptions from the Mandate."216 This cannot continue; 
supporters need to find ways to bring affirmative litigation in order to 
promote the ACA as anti-subordination legislation. In its amicus 
brief, the National Women's Law Center notes that in 2000, the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) considered and 
upheld a Title VII challenge to an employer's refusal to include 
contraception coverage in its employee health plan, even though the 
plan otherwise included comprehensive coverage of prescription 
drugs.217 Specifically, the EEOC found that Congress, in passing the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act,218 intended "to equalize employment 
opportunities for men and women, and to address discrimination 
against female employees that was based on assumptions that they 
would become pregnant. "219 Because "[ c ]ontraception is a means by 
which a woman controls her ability to become pregnant," the EEOC 
held that "the PDA's prohibition of discrimination in connection with 
a woman's ability to become pregnant necessarily includes the denial 
of benefits for contraception."22o 
Where possible, challenges to employer attempts to opt out of ACA 
requirements should be considered and pursued. Title VII would be a 
likely avenue in cases involving the contraception mandate. Indeed, 
employees facing the loss of access to preventive care benefits may 
wish to intervene in pending actions. 221 Employees of corporations 
215. See SUSAN BERKE FOGEL & 'TRACY A. WEITZ, NAT'L HEALTH L. PROGRAM, HEALTH 
CARE REFUSALS: UNDERMINING QUALITY CARE FOR WOMEN 8-9, 66 (2010), available 
at http://www.healthlaw.orgipublicationslhealth-care-refusals-undermining-care-for-
women#. VBu _7y5dVY c. 
216. Gedicks & Koppelman, supra note 153, at 65. 
217. See EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, DECISION ON COVERAGE OF 
CONTRACEPTION 1, 5 (2000), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/decision-
contraception.htrnl (finding that Respondents violated Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act by excluding insurance coverage for prescription contraceptive drugs and devices 
in their health insurance plan). 
218. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012) (amending Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to 
prohibit sex discrimination on the basis of pregnancy). 
219. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, supra note 217, at 2-3. 
220. Id. 
221. See Gedicks & Koppelman, supra note 153, at 65 & n.57 (noting that some female 
Notre Dame students intervened in the school's lawsuit against the contraception 
mandate). 
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who find their religious exercise infringed by their employers may 
wish to challenge RFRA itself.222 
The Hobby Lobby decision only affects federal law, and the 
limitations imposed by RFRA only apply to federal actions. 223 Some 
states have enacted their own contraceptive coverage requirements 
that pre-date the ACA.224 Therefore, some closely held corporations 
still may be required to provide contraceptive coverage to their 
employees.225 ACA supporters can advance the anti-subordination 
narrative by making sure that these requirements are enforced against 
employers. 
Finally, given the Obama Administration's inability to advocate 
successfully for the rights of workers, especially women, against the 
interests of their employers in order to make sure that their access to 
health care is protected, feminists may wish to pursue a different path 
entirely. It has been suggested in some quarters that, given the other 
mechanisms put in place by the ACA, the employer mandate is not 
necessarily needed to reduce the number of uninsured Americans. 226 
Why not eliminate the employer mandate and sever the required 
connection between employment and health care? Proponents of 
eliminating the mandate argue that it would reduce employer 
opposition to the ACA without significantly reducing insurance 
coverage and would avoid some of the labor market distortions 
caused by employers attempting to avoid the mandate's 
requirements.227 In order to protect their ability to define their own 
health in the aftermath of Hobby Lobby, ACA supporters may need to 
222. See Brief of The Freedom From Religion Foundation, Bishopaccountability.org, 
Children's Healthcare is a Legal Duty, The Child Protection Project, The Foundation 
to Abolish Child Sex Abuse, Survivors for Justice, and The Survivors Network of 
Those Abused by Priests as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioner at 34, Burwell 
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354),2014 WL 333897 
(urging the Court to hold that RFRA is unconstitutional). 
223. CYNTHIA BROUGHER, CONGo RESEARCH SERV., R43654, FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION 
BY CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS: IMPLICATIONS OF BURWELL v. HOBBY LOBBY STORES, 
INC. 10 (2014), available at http://fas.orglsgp/crs/miscIR43654.pdf (addressing the 
effect of the Court's decision under federal and state law). 
224. Jd. 
225. Id. 
226. LINDA J. BLUMBERG ET AL., WHY NOT JUST ELIMINATE THE EMPLOYER MANDATE? 4 
(Urban Inst. et al. eds., 2014), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/ 
413117-Why-Not-Just-Eliminate-the-Employer-Mandate.pdf (finding that the 
Affordable Care Act's employer mandate is not necessarily needed to expand health 
insurance coverage). 
227. Jd. at 2-4. 
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take the radical step of actively lobbying against the implementation 
of one of the ACA' s chief provisions. 228 
C. How We Talk About The ACA Matters 
Last year's ACA implementation debacle is a reminder that no 
matter how good a law or policy might be, it still must be 
implemented efficiently in order to have public support and to 
achieve its intended outcomes.229 One could argue that if Obamacare 
had rolled out smoothly, there never would have been any 
controversy about some consumers not being able to keep their 
current insurance. If the ACA is to chart new paths for the delivery 
of healthcare, consumers must understand what is at stake. 
Supporters of the Affordable Care Act should be concerned about 
what Ericson and Kessler have called "the articulation effect" of 
government policy; that is, how the articulation of government policy 
affects behavior.230 Ericson and Kessler studied the effect of the 
debate over the ACA's requirement for individuals to purchase health 
insurance. 231 They found that the controversy over the individual 
228. See J.D. Harrison, Obamacare's Employer Mandate is Under Attackfrom Both Sides. 
Will it Survive?, WASH. POST (June 10,2014), http://www.washingtonpost.coml 
business/on-small-business/obamacares-employer-mandate-is-under-attack-from-
both-sides-will-it-survive/20 14/06/09/51 fc 194-ed85-11 e3-92b8-
52344c12e8al_story.html. It must be noted, however, that House Republicans have 
filed suit against President Obama regarding implementation of the ACA, and given 
the difficulty of passing any legislation through the current Congress, it is not so easy 
to envision how a repeal of the employer mandate could take place. See Alex Rogers, 
House Grants Boehner Authority to Sue Obama, TIME (July 30, 2014) 
http://time.coml306ll74lhouse-grants-boehner-authority-to-sue-obama/; United States 
House of Representatives v. Bunvell, No.1: 14-cv-01967 (D.D.C., 2014), available at 
https:lljonathanturley.files.wordpress.coml2014/11lhouse-v-burwell-d-d-c-complaint-
filed.pdf (alleging that President Obama has overstepped his authority to fund the 
ACA by not obtaining a congressional appropriation for the subsidies provided to 
reduce the cost of purchasing insurance); see also Drew DeSilver, Congress Ends 
Least-Productive Year in Recent History, PEW REs. CENTER (Dec. 23, 2013), 
http://www.pewresearch.orglfuct-tank/20l3/l2l23/congress-ends-least-productive-year-in-
recent-history 1 (fmding that the 113th Congress has only passed 55 substantive laws, 
which is the least number of passed laws in two decades). 
229. See generally Press Release, President Barack Obama, Statement by the President on 
the Affordable Care Act (Oct. 21,2013, 11:33 AM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/20 13/1 0/211remarks-president-affordable-care-act (acknowledging the 
frustrations people faced when trying to use the ACA's insurance marketplace 
website, Heathcare.gov, after its roll out on October 1, 2013). 
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Policy: Health Insurance Mandates Versus Taxes (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 18913,2013). 
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mandate provision changed the political discourse during the period 
from December 2011 to November 2012.232 Specifically, over the 
course of that year, the description of the minimum coverage 
requirement as a mandate, rather than a tax, lost effectiveness in 
increasing the probability that an individual would purchase health 
insurance.233 Prior to the controversy, individuals surveyed were 
nearly 11 percent more likely to purchase insurance pursuant to a 
policy articulated as a "mandate" rather than a taX.234 After a year of 
controversy over the provision, the mandate language became no 
more effective than calling it a tax. 235 Ericson and Kessler estimate 
that decreasing the likelihood that individuals will purchase insurance 
might create a difference of as much as $1000 in the cost of annual 
premiums for those who do purchase insurance; thus, they argue that 
persuasion and public opinion management are crucial to achieving 
policy objectives at lower COSt.236 
ACA supporters should take these findings very seriously and act. 
They have allowed the debate over the ACA-which includes the 
past and current Supreme Court and lower court cases and their 
arguments-to be more about the rights of business owners than 
about civil rights or the rights of those who benefit from the ACA. 
To turn this tide, proponents must identify and create opportunities to 
promote the ACA as anti-subordination legislation, protecting the 
rights of workers, women, and minorities. Only by confronting and 
discussing the historical precedents underlying our path-dependent 
health care system can supporters of the ACA make a case for the 
provisions of the ACA that will alter that path dependence. 
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